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CORPORATIONS-EXTENT TO WHICH VOTE OF PROXY BINDS THE SHARE-
HOLDERS-Plaintiff; in a derivative action, charged certain directors of the 
corporation with appropriating a corporate opportunity to their own bene-
fit. Defendant directors moved for summary judgment· on the ground 
that the questioned transaction was ratified by the stockholders, with plain-
tiff's stock being voted by proxy in favor of ratification. Held, motion for 
summary judgment denied. The plaintiff was not estopped from suit 
even though her proxyholder, the corporation management, voted her 
stock for the ratification, since she had no notice that the question was 
to be voted on when she gave her proxy. Gottlieb v. McKee, (Del. Ch. 
1954) 107 A._ (2d) 240. 
Proxy agreements have been examined carefully by the courts in an 
effort to prevent their abuse by those in control of a corporation.1 It is 
generally agreed that the authority of the holder of a general proxy is 
limited to ordinary matters. He may not vote for fundamental changes 
or on unusual transactions unless specifically mentioned in the proxy.2 
The difficulty lies in determining what is a fundamental change or an 
unusual transaction. It has been held that the proxyholder can vote to 
ratify an unauthorized gift of stock to the president of the company,8 
ratify an unauthorized chattel mortgage of company assets,4 ratify a con-
tract between the corporation and its president/; exercise a corporate option 
to purchase stock.,6 amend the corporate by-laws,7 and elect a different 
director than expected.8 The shareholder is not bound when his general 
proxy is voted to liquidate assets9 or dissolve the corporate business.10 
1 For the problems involved in the use of. proxies see 53 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1165 (1940); 
33 ILL. L. R.Ev. 914 (1939). 
2Farish v. Cieneguita Copper Co., 12 Ariz. 235, 100 P. 781 (1909); Rossing v. State 
Bank of Bode, 181 Iowa 1013, 165 N.W. 254 (1917). See also BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS, 
rev. ed., §178 (1946). 
3 Gray v. Aspironal Laboratories, (5th Cir. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 97. 
4 McClean v. Bradley, (D.C. Ohio 1922) 282 F. 1011, affd. (5th Cir. 1924) 299 F. 379. 
5 Holmes v. Republic Steel Corp., 84 Ohio App. 442, 84 N.E. (2d) 508 (1948). 
6 Elster v. American Airlines, (Del. Ch. 1953) 100 A. (2d) 219. 
7 Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136 (1933). 
s Hauth v. Giant Portland Cement Co., (Del. Ch. 1953) 96 A. (2d) 233. 
9 McKee v. Home Savings & Trust Co., 122 Iowa 731, 98 N.W. 609 (1904). 
10 Shield v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 202 S.W. 211. 
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Some courts go so far as to say that the shareholder is bound unless the 
proxyholder acts in bad faith or for personal aggrandizement.11 It is ap-
parent from the relevant cases that there is no definite test available for 
determining the scope of authority delegated by a general proxy. Whether 
the meeting at which the shares are voted is a general or special one,12 and 
the specific wording of the proxy, are factors which may influence the 
court's decision.13 Even though it is determined that the shareholder 
will not be bound by his proxyholder's vote, he still is under a duty to 
repudiate that vote immediately lest he become bound by laches.14 
When a shareholder acquiesces to the protested action he is disqualified 
from bringing suit thereon.15 By virtue of the agency relationship inherent 
in a proxy,16 a proxy voted within the scope of its authority constitutes 
acquiescence on behalf of the shareholder to the matter voted on.17 The 
court, in the principal case, found that the proxyholder's vote for ratifica-
tion was within the authority of the general proxy given him.18 The court's 
reliance on the plaintiffs lack of knowledge, an element essential to the 
defense of estoppel,19 is undercut by the acceptable practice of imputing 
to a shareholder the knowledge of a proxyholder who is acting within 
his authority.20 The situation is analogous to the acquiesence imputed 
to a bona fide purchaser from a ratifying stockholder for the purpose 
of estopping the former from suing on the transaction ratified by the 
latter.21 Nevertheless, it is likely that the court reached the correct decision 
in the principal case. But rather than becoming tangled in estoppel theory, 
the court might better have justified its decision by finding that the vote 
to ratify was not a proper exercise of the authority conferred on the proxy-
holder, and thus not binding on the shareholder. The fact that the plain-
tiff had no prior knowledge of the vote to ratify (in fact, she had been 
advised that these resolutions would not be submitted to a vote) and the 
11 Blair v. Smith Co., 18 Del. Ch. 150, 156 A. 207 (1931); Lowman v. Harvey R. 
Pierce Co., 276 Pa. 382, 120 A. 404 (1923). 
/12 Synnott v. Cumberland Bldg. Loan Assn., (6th Cir. 1902) 117 F. 379. 
13 It should be possible to word a proxy statement broadly enough to cover any 
matter that might be voted on. 
'14 Fidelity Building and Loan Assn. v. Thompson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 25 S.W. 
(2d) 247, revd. on other grounds in (Tex. Com. App. 1932) 45 S.W. (2d) 167, reh. den. 
(Tex. Com. App. 1932) 51 S.W. (2d) 578. See also Synnott v. Cumberland Bldg. Loan 
Assn., note 12 supra. 
111 Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523, 100 A. 645 (1917). For a 
discussion of the ways in which acquiescence may be shown see STEVENS, CORPORATIONS, 
2d ed., §I71 (1949). 
16 Patterson v. Henrietta Mills, 219 N.C 7, 12 S.E. (2d) 686 (1941); Seaman v. 
Ironwood Amusement Corp., 283 Mich. 220, 278 N.W. 51 (1938); Steinberg v. American 
Bantam Car Co.,, (D.C. Pa. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 426. 
:17 Chounis v. Laing, 125 W.Va. 275, 23 S.E. (2d) 628 (1942); Gray v. Aspironal 
Laboratories, note 3 supra; McClean v. Bradley, note 4 supra. 
18 Principal case at 244. 
19 Nolop v. Spettel, 267 Wis. 245, 64 N.W. (2d) 859 (1954) . 
.20 See Gray v. Aspironal Laboratories, note 3 supra. 
21 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., §148 (1946). 
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unusual nature of the resolutions seem to be ample evidence that the 
vote was not authorized by the proxy.22 In addition, where, as here, the 
directors have successfully solicited the shareholder's proxy, the courts 
should look with skepticism at their attempt to vote the proxy on a matter 
affecting them personally, but which was not mentioned in the proxy 
solicitation. 
Herbert R. Brown, S.Ed. 
22 Even if the matter is unusual in nature, the stockholder might be bound by his 
proxy's vote if he had actual notice that this matter was to be brought to a vote at the 
meeting for which the proxy was given. The question of shareholder's knowledge would 
then become a vital element in determining the authority of the proxyholder. 
